In an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme, there is a key extraction protocol where a user submits an identity string to a master authority who then returns the corresponding secret key for that identity. In this work, we describe how this protocol can be performed efficiently and in a blind fashion for several known IBE schemes; that is, a user can obtain a secret key for an identity without the master authority learning anything about this identity.
Introduction
In an oblivious transfer (OT N k ) protocol, introduced by Rabin [Rab81] and generalized by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [EGL82] and Brassard, Crépeau and Robert [BCR86] , a Sender with messages M 1 , . . . , M N and a Receiver with indices σ 1 , . . . , σ k ∈ [1, N ] interact in such a way that at the end the Receiver obtains M σ 1 , . . . , M σ k without learning anything about the other messages and the Sender does not learn anything about σ 1 , . . . , σ k . Naor and Pinkas were the first to consider an adaptive setting, OT N k×1 , where the sender may obtain M σ i−1 before deciding on σ i [NP99b] . Oblivious transfer is a useful, interesting primitive in its own right, but it has even greater significance as OT N k×1 protocols that are secure in the "full-simulation" model, where the security of both the Sender and Receiver are simulation-based. These simulatable OT protocols are particularly nice because they can be used to construct other cryptographic protocols in a simulatable fashion. More specifically, Camenisch et al. [CNS07] provide two distinct results. First, they show how to efficiently construct OT N k×1
generically from any unique blind signature scheme in the random oracle model. The two known efficient unique blind signature schemes due to Chaum [Cha82] and Boldyreva [Bol03] both require interactive complexity assumptions: one-more-inversion RSA and chosen-target CDH, respectively. (Interestingly, when instantiated with Chaum signatures, this construction coincides with a prior one of Ogata and Kurosawa [OK04] that was analyzed in the half-simulation model.) Second, they provide a clever OT N k×1 construction in the standard model based on dynamic complexity assumptions, namely the q-Power Decisional Diffie-Hellman (i.e., in a bilinear setting e : G×G → G T , given (g, g x , g x 2 , . . . , g x q , H) where g ← G and H ← G T , distinguish (H x , H x 2 , . . . , H x q ) from random values) and q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumptions. (Unfortunately, Cheon showed that q-SDH requires larger than commonly used security parameters [Che06] ). These dynamic (including interactive) assumptions seem significantly stronger than those, such as DDH and quadratic residuosity, used to construct efficient OT schemes in the half-simulation model. Thus, a well-motivated problem is to find efficient, fully-simulatable and adaptive OT schemes under weaker complexity assumptions.
Our Contributions. In this work, we provide, to our knowledge, the first efficient and fullysimulatable OT N k and OT N k×1 schemes secure under static complexity assumptions (e.g., DBDH, where given (g, g a , g b , g c ), it is hard to distinguish e(g, g) abc from random). We summarize our results as follows.
First, we introduce a building block, which is of independent interest. In identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84] , there is an extraction protocol where a user submits an identity string to a master authority who then returns the corresponding decryption key for that identity. We formalize the notion of blindly executing this protocol, in a strong sense; where the authority does not learn the identity nor can she cause failures dependent on the identity, and the user learns nothing beyond the normal extraction protocol. This concept has similarities to recent work by Goyal [Goy07] , in which a user wishes to hide certain characteristics of an extracted IBE key from the authority. In §3.1, we describe efficient blind extraction protocols satisfying this definition for the IBE schemes due to Boneh and Boyen [BB04] and Waters [Wat05] (using a generalization proposed independently by Naccache [Nac05] and Chatterjee and Sarkar [CS05] ). The latter protocol is similar to a blind signature scheme proposed by Okamoto [Oka06] . We call IBE schemes supporting efficient blind extraction protocols: blind IBE, for short. Second, we present an efficient and fully-simulatable OT N k protocol constructed from any of the proposed blind IBE schemes (without requiring additional assumptions), and thus our constructions are secure under only DBDH. Intuitively, consider the following OT N k construction. The Sender runs the IBE setup algorithm and sends the corresponding public parameters to the Receiver. Next, for i = 1 to N , the Sender encrypts M i under identity "i" and sends this ciphertext to the Receiver. To obtain k messages, the Receiver blindly extracts k decryption keys for identities of his choice and uses these keys to decrypt and recover the corresponding messages. While this simple protocol does not appear to be simulatable, we are able to appropriately modify it. (Indeed, one must also be cautious of possibly malformed ciphertexts, as we discuss later.) Our constructions from blind IBE are inspired by the Camenisch et al. [CNS07] generic construction from unique blind signatures. Indeed, recall that the secret keys sk id of any fully-secure IBE can be viewed as signatures by the authority on the message id [BF01] . Camenisch et al. [CNS07] require unique blind signatures, whereas we do not; however, where they require unforgeability, we require that our "blind key extraction" protocol does not jeopardize the semantic security of the IBE.
Third, we present an efficient and fully-simulatable OT N k×1 protocol constructed from our proposed blind IBE schemes in the random oracle model. We discuss how to remove these oracles at an additional cost. This improves on the complexity assumptions required by the comparable random-oracle scheme in Camenisch et al. [CNS07] , although we leave the same improvement for their adaptive construction without random oracles as an open problem. Finally, in §5, we discuss the independent usefulness of blind IBE to other applications, such as blind signatures, anonymous email, and encrypted keyword search.
Subsequent Work. The original publication of this work left open some problems which have since been addressed. We now briefly summarize these developments. First, Lindell [Lin08] proposed several efficient and simulatable OT N k protocols secure under weaker assumptions than those used in this work, e.g., DDH and Quadratic Residuosity. While these protocols have efficiency comparable to (or better than) the non-adaptive OT N k protocols in this work, they do not address the adaptive case (OT N k×1 ). Thus it remains open to devise efficient and simulatable OT N k×1 under weaker assumptions than those used by this work and [CNS07] .
Other works have proposed efficient OT protocols secure under concurrent execution. Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters [PVW07] recently proposed an elegant framework for constructing (non-adaptive) OT N k using "messy keys", and showed how to realize these in the Universal Composability (UC) model of Canetti [Can01] under DDH, Quadratic Residuosity, or lattice assumptions. Independently, Green and Hohenberger [GH08] proposed a UC-secure adaptive OT N k×1 using assumptions in bilinear groups. While each of these works represents a theoretical advance, we note that the adaptive protocols of this work and [CNS07] are still the most efficient choice for applications where concurrent execution is not required.
Technical Preliminaries
Let BMsetup be an algorithm that, on input the security parameter 1 κ , outputs the parameters for a bilinear mapping as γ = (q, g, G, G T , e), where g generates G, both G and G T have prime order q, and e : G × G → G T . In our schemes, we will require that the correctness of these parameters be publicly verifiable (Chen et al. [CCS07] describe efficient techniques for verifying these parameters in a typical instantiation). We will refer to the following complexity assumption made in these groups.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) [BF01] :
For all p.p.t. adversaries Adv, the following probability is strictly less than 1/2 + 1/poly(κ):
Known Discrete-Logarithm-Based, Zero-Knowledge Proofs. We use known techniques for proving statements about discrete logarithms, such as (1) proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm modulo a prime [Sch91] , (2) proof that a committed value lies in a given integer interval [CFT98, CM99, Bou00], and also (3) proof of the disjunction or conjunction of any two of the previous [CDS94] . These protocols are secure under the discrete logarithm assumption, although some implementations of (2) require the Strong RSA assumption.
When referring to the proofs above, we will use the notation of Camenisch and Stadler [CS97] . For instance, PoK {(x, r) : y = g x h r ∧ (1 ≤ x ≤ n)} denotes a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of integers x and r such that y = g x h r holds and 1 ≤ x ≤ n. All values not in enclosed in ()'s are assumed to be known to the verifier. We can apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] to make such proofs non-interactive in the random oracle model.
Commitments. Let (CSetup, Commit, Decommit) be a commitment scheme where CSetup generates public parameters ρ; on input a message M , Commit(ρ, M ) outputs a pair (C, D); and Decommit(ρ, M, C, D) outputs 1 if D decommits C to M , or 0 otherwise. Our subsequent constructions require an efficient protocol for proving knowledge of a decommitment D with respect to (ρ, M, C). We recommend using the Pedersen commitment scheme [Ped92] based on the discrete logarithm assumption, in which the public parameters are a group of prime order q, and random generators (g 0 , . . . , g m ). In order to commit to the values (v 1 , . . . , v m ) ∈ Z m q , pick a random r ∈ Z q and set C = g r 
Blind Identity-Based Encryption
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme supports two types of players: a single master authority and multiple users; together with the algorithms Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt and the protocol Extract. Let us provide some input/output specification for these protocols with intuition for what they do.
Notation: Let I be the identity space and M be the message space. We write P (A(a), B(b)) → (c, d) to indicate that protocol P is between parties A and B, where a is A's input, c is A's output, b is B's input and d is B's output.
-In the Setup(1 κ , c(κ)) algorithm, on input a security parameter 1 κ and a description of an the identity space |I| ≤ 2 c(κ) where c(·) is a computable, polynomially-bounded function, the master authority P outputs master parameters params and a master secret key msk . -In the Extract(P(params, msk ), U(params, id)) → (id , sk id ) protocol, an honest user U with identity id ∈ I obtains the corresponding secret key sk id from the master authority P or outputs an error message. The master authority's output is the identity id or an error message. 1 (Note that P is permitted to abort the protocol selectively based on id .) -In the Encrypt(params, id, m) algorithm, on input identity id ∈ I and message m ∈ M, any party can output ciphertext C. -In the Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C) algorithm, on input a ciphertext C, the user with sk id outputs a message m ∈ M or the distinguished symbol φ.
Throughout the remainder of the text we will assume that params defines I and M. On stronger notions of ciphertext security for IBE. A stronger notion of ciphertext security for IBE schemes is adaptive-identity security (IND-ID-CPA) [BF01] , which strengthens the IND-sID-CPA definition by allowing A to select the target identity id * at the start of step (4) in the above game. In §3.1, we show blind IBE schemes satisfying both IND-sID-CPA and IND-ID-CPA security. Fortunately, our oblivious transfer applications in §4 require only IND-sID-CPA-security (because the "identities" will be fixed integers from 1 to poly(κ)), some additional applications in §5 require the stronger IND-ID-CPA-security.
Blind IBE. So far, we have only described traditional IBE schemes. A blind IBE scheme consists of the same players, together with the same algorithms Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt and yet we replace the protocol Extract with a new protocol BlindExtract which differs only in the authority's output: -In the BlindExtract(P(params, msk ), U(params, id)) → (nothing, sk id ) protocol, an honest user U with identity id ∈ I obtains the corresponding secret key sk id from the master authority P or outputs an error message. The master authority's output is nothing or an error message.
We now define security for blind IBE, which informally is any IND-sID-CPA-secure IBE scheme with a BlindExtract protocol that satisfies two properties:
1. Leak-free Extract: a potentially malicious user cannot learn anything by executing the BlindExtract protocol with an honest authority which she could not have learned by executing the Extract protocol with an honest authority; moreover, as in Extract, the user must know the identity for which she is extracting a key.
2. Selective-failure Blindness: a potentially malicious authority cannot learn anything about the user's choice of identity during the BlindExtract protocol; moreover, the authority cannot cause the BlindExtract protocol to fail in a manner dependent on the user's choice.
Of course, a protocol realizing the functionality BlindExtract (in a fashion that satisfies the properties above) is a special case of secure two-party computation [Yao86, GMW87, Kil88] . However, using generic tools may be inefficient, so as in the case of blind signature protocols, we seek to optimize this specific computation. Indeed, recall that sk id in an adaptive-identity secure IBE can be viewed as a signature by the authority on message id (see §5). Thus, our BlindExtract protocol (for an adaptive-identity secure IBE) is a blind signature scheme, but the converse implication is not necessarily true. Our leak-free extraction property is much stronger than the common onemore unforgeability requirement of blind signatures. Moreover, we will not require adaptive-identity security for the IBE in our OT applications. Let us now formally state these properties. Game Real: Run (params, msk ) ← Setup(1 κ , c(κ)) and give params to D. As many times as D wants, A chooses an identity id and atomically executes the BlindExtract protocol with P: BlindExtract(P(params, msk ), A(params, id )). A's output (which is the output of the game) includes the list of identities and extracted keys.
Game Ideal: Run (params, msk ) ← Setup(1 κ , c(κ)). As many times as D wants, S chooses an identity id and queries a trusted party to obtain the output of Extract(params, msk , id ), if id ∈ I and ⊥ otherwise. S's output (which is the output of the game) includes the list of identities and extracted keys.
In the games above, BlindExtract and Extract are treated as atomic operations. Hence D and A (or S) may communicate at any time except during the execution of those protocols. Additionally, while we do not explicitly specify that auxiliary information is given to the parties, this information must be provided in order to achieve the sequential composition property required by our OT protocols in §4.
This definition implies that the identity id (for the key being extracted) is extractable from the BlindExtract protocol-with all but negligible probability-since for every adversary there exists a S that must be able to interact with A to learn which identities to submit to the trusted party. We will make use of this observation later. Another nice property of this definition is that any key extraction protocol with leak-freeness (regardless of whether blindness holds or not) composes into the existing security definitions for IBE. (This would not necessarily be true of a blind signature protocol for the same type of signatures.) We state this formally below.
Lemma 3.3 If Π = (Setup, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt) is an IND-sID-CPA-secure (resp., IND-ID-CPA) IBE scheme and BlindExtract associated with Π is leak-free, then Π = (Setup, BlindExtract, Encrypt, Decrypt) is an IND-sID-CPA-secure (resp., IND-ID-CPA) IBE scheme.
Next, we define the second property of blindness. We use a strong notion of blindness called selective-failure blindness proposed recently by Camenisch et al. [CNS07] , ensuring that even a malicious authority is unable to induce BlindExtract protocol failures that are dependent on the identity being extracted. We thus arrive at the following definition. 
IBE Schemes with Efficient BlindExtract Protocols
In this section, we describe efficient BlindExtract protocols for: (1) the IND-sID-CPA-secure IBE due to Boneh and Boyen [BB04] and (2) the IND-ID-CPA-secure IBE proposed independently by Naccache [Nac05] and Chatterjee-Sarkar [CS05] which is a generalized version of Waters IBE [Wat05] . Note that in §3.3 we will be adding some additional features to these IBE schemes; these will help us to construct oblivious transfer protocols in §4. Since all of these schemes share a similar structure, we'll begin by describing their common elements.
Setup(1 κ , c(k)): Let γ = (q, g, G, G T , e) be the output of BMsetup(1 κ ). Choose random elements h, g 2 ∈ G and a random value α ∈ Z q . Set g 1 = g α . Finally, select a function F : I → G that maps identities to group elements. (The descriptions of F and I will be defined specific to the schemes below.) Output params = (γ, g, g 1 , g 2 , h, F ) and msk = g α 2 .
Extract: Identity secret keys are of the form:
where r ∈ Z q is randomly chosen by the master authority. Note that the correctness of these keys can be publicly verified using a test described below.
Encrypt(params, id, M ): Given an identity id ∈ I, and a message M ∈ G T , select a random s ∈ Z q and output the ciphertext
Next, we'll describe the precise format of the secret keys sk id and corresponding BlindExtract protocols for particular IBEs.
. If the proof fails to verify, abort.
Choose r
10. If the check passes, choose z 
A secret key for identity id , where r ∈ Z q is random, is:
The protocol BlindExtract(P(params, msk ), U(params, id )) is described in Figure 1 . Recall that U wants to obtain sk id without revealing id , and P wants to reveal no more than sk id . Let Π 1 be the blind IBE that combines algorithms Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt with the protocol BlindExtract in Figure 1 .
Theorem 3.6 Under the DBDH assumption, blind IBE Π 1 is secure (according to Definition 3.5); i.e., BlindExtract is both leak-free and selective-failure blind.
See Appendix A for proof of Theorem 3.6.
A BlindExtract Protocol for an IND-ID-CPA-Secure IBE
In the generalized version of Waters IBE [Wat05] , proposed independently by Naccache [Nac05] and Chatterjee and Sarkar [CS05] , the identity space I is the set of bit strings of length N , where N is polynomial in κ, represented by n blocks of bits each. The function
j , where each u j ∈ G is randomly selected by the master authority and each a j is an -bit segment of id . Naccache discusses practical IBE deployment with N = 160 and = 32 [Nac05] . A secret key for identity id , where r ∈ Z q is random, is:
The protocol BlindExtract(P(params, msk ), U(params, id )) is described in Figure 1 , with the following alterations. Parse the identity as id = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), where each a i is bits. In line 2, compute h as g y · n j=1 u a j j . In line 3, execute the proof PoK {(y, a 1 , . . . , a n ) : h = g y · n j=1 u a j j ∧ 0 ≤ a i < 2 , for i = 1 to n}. The range part of this proof (e.g., 0 ≤ a i < 2 ) can be performed exactly or, by shortening each a i by a few bits, can be done at almost no additional cost [CFT98, CM99, Bou00] . Follow the rest of the protocol as is. Let Π 2 be the blind IBE that combines Setup, Encrypt, Decrypt with the BlindExtract protocol described above.
Theorem 3.7 Under the DBDH assumption, blind IBE Π 2 is secure (according to Definition 3.5); i.e., BlindExtract is both leak-free and selective-failure blind.
See Appendix A for proof of Theorem 3.7.
On Other IBEs and HIBEs
Let us briefly summarize what we know about efficient BlindExtract protocols for other IBE schemes and hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes. First, random oracle based IBEs [BF01, Coc01] appear to be less suited to developing efficient BlindExtract protocols than their standard model successors. This is in part due to the fact that the identity string is hashed into an element in G in these schemes, instead of represented as an integer exponent, which makes our proof of knowledge techniques unwieldy. We were not able to find BlindExtract protocols for the Boneh and Franklin [BF01], Cocks [Coc01] , or the recent Boneh-Gentry-Hamburg [BGH07] IBEs with running time better than O(|I|), where I is the identity space. Additionally, we did not consider the efficient IBE of Gentry [Gen06] , as our focus was on schemes with static complexity assumptions.
We additionally considered hierarchical IBE schemes, such as those due to Boneh and Boyen [BB04] , Waters [Wat05] and Chatterjee and Sarkar [CS06] . For all of these HIBEs, the number of elements comprising an identity secret key grow with the depth of the hierarchy, but each piece is similar in format to the original keys and our same techniques would apply.
Additional Properties for a Blind IBE
In §4, we use blind IBE as a tool for constructing oblivious transfer protocols. We can use either of the efficient blind IBEs Π 1 and Π 2 defined above together with the following observations about efficient protocols relating to them.
Efficient PoK for master secret. Our OT constructions in §4 require an efficient zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol for the statement PoK {(msk ) : (params, msk ) ∈ Setup(1 κ , c(κ))}. If we were not concerned about efficiency, we could accomplish this proof using general techniques [Yao86, GMW87, Kil88] . However, for the parameters used in Π 1 , Π 2 , this proof can be conducted efficiently in a number of ways; one technique is to redefine msk = α ∈ Z q and prove the equivalent statement PoK {(α) : g 1 = g α } using a standard Schnorr proof [Sch91] .
Committing IBE. To construct our OT protocols, we will require that our blind IBE schemes be committing. This property is related to committing encryption [CFGN96] , but deals with the fact that IBE decryption keys may be extracted from malicious parties. Intuitively, we want to ensure that a given ciphertext C id always decrypts to a single plaintext, even when the decryption keys are extracted from a malicious PKG.
Somewhat more formally, we require that an adversary playing the role of the PKG is unable to generate an identity/ciphertext pair (id, C) and-by conducting the extraction protocol with an honest party-any two keys sk id , sk id such that Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C) = Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C). We observe that this property holds trivially for any IBE scheme where identity keys are "unique" (there is at most one decryption key per identity). However, in the schemes Π 1 and Π 2 , there are many valid decryption keys for a given identity. This may lead to a condition where some incorrectly-formed ciphertexts will decrypt to different values depending on which secret key is used.
Fortunately, this issue can be addressed via a publicly-computable ciphertext correctness check, which we denote by IsValid(params, id , C). In the case of blind IBE schemes Π 1 and Π 2 , we implement this check by first verifying the group parameters γ are valid (see [CCS07] ), then verifying that for any params and C = (X, Y, Z), all the values are in the correct groups and the following relation holds:
The correctness property for the IsValid algorithm is that it outputs 1 for all honestly-generated parameters and ciphertexts. From the description of Π 1 and Π 2 , it is easy to see that IsValid is correct. The algorithm's behavior in the case of maliciously-generated input is implicitly contained within the following definition:
Definition 3.8 (Committing IBE) An IBE scheme (resp., blind IBE) Π is committing if and only if: (1) it is IND-sID-CPA-secure (resp., secure in the sense of definition 3.5) and (2) every p.p.t. adversary A has an advantage negligible in κ for the following game: First, A outputs params, id ∈ I and a ciphertext C. If IsValid(params, id, C) = 1 then abort. Otherwise, the challenger, on input (params, id), runs the Extract (resp., BlindExtract) protocol with A twice to obtain purported keys sk id , sk id . A's advantage is defined as:
Pr Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C) = Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C) Theorem 3.9 Combined with the IsValid algorithm defined above, both Π 1 and Π 2 , are committing blind IBE schemes (in the sense of definition 3.8).
We present a proof of theorem 3.9 in Appendix D.
Simulatable Oblivious Transfer
We now turn our attention to constructing efficient and fully-simulatable oblivious transfer protocols. We'll use any of the efficient blind IBEs presented in the previous section as a building block. In particular, we focus on building (non-adaptive) OT N k and (adaptive) OT N k×1 protocols, in which a Sender and Receiver transfer up to k messages out of an N -message set. In the non-adaptive model [BCR86, NP99a] , the Receiver requests all k messages simultaneously. In the adaptive model [NP99b] , the Receiver may request the messages one at a time, using the result of previous transfers to inform successive requests. Intuitively, the Receiver should learn only the messages it requests (and nothing about the remaining messages), while the Sender should gain no information about which messages the Receiver selected.
Full-simulation vs. half-simulation security. Security for oblivious transfer is defined using the real-world/ideal-world paradigm. In the real world, a Sender and Receiver interact directly according to the protocol, while in the ideal world, the parties interact via a trusted party. Informally, a protocol is secure if, for every real-world cheating Sender (resp., Receiver) we can describe an ideal-world counterpart who gains as much information from the ideal-world interaction as from the real protocol. Much of the oblivious transfer literature uses the simulation-based definition only to show Sender security, choosing to define Receiver security by a simpler game-based definition. Naor and Pinkas demonstrated that this weaker "half-simulation" approach permits selective-failure attacks, in which a malicious Sender induces transfer failures that are dependent on the message that the Receiver requests [NP99b] . Recently, Camenisch et al. [CNS07] proposed several practical OT N k×1 protocols that are secure under a "full-simulation" definition, using adaptive (e.g., q-PDDH) or interactive (e.g., one-more-inversion RSA) assumptions. We now enhance their results by demonstrating efficient full-simulation OT 
Definitions of OT
For consistency with earlier work, we quote the definitions of Camenisch et al. [CNS07] with the following modification: while that work focuses solely on adaptive OT, our definitions also consider the non-adaptive version of the primitive. )) An oblivious transfer scheme is a tuple of algorithms (S I , R I , S T , R T ). During the initialization phase, the Sender and the Receiver run an interactive protocol, where the Sender runs S I (M 1 , . . . , M N ) to obtain state value S 0 , and the Receiver runs R I () to obtain state value R 0 . Next, during the transfer phase, the Sender and Receiver interactively execute S T , R T , respectively, k times as described below.
Adaptive OT. In the adaptive OT N k×1 case, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the i th transfer proceeds as follows: the Sender runs S T (S i−1 ) to obtain state value S i , and the Receiver runs R T (R i−1 , σ i ) where 1 ≤ σ i ≤ N is the index of the message to be received. The receiver obtains state information R i and the message M σ i or ⊥ indicating failure.
Non-adaptive OT. In the non-adaptive OT N k case the parties execute the protocol as in the previous case; however, for each round i < k the algorithm R T (R i−1 , σ i ) does not output a message. At the end of the the k th transfer R T (R k−1 , σ k ) outputs the full collection (M σ 1 , . . . , M σ k ) where for j = 1, . . . , N each M σ j is a valid message or the symbol ⊥ indicating protocol failure. (In a non-adaptive scheme, the k transfers do not necessarily require a corresponding number of communication rounds.)
We now address the security definition for Oblivious Transfer. is defined according to the following experiments. Note that, as in [CNS07] we do not explicitly specify auxiliary input to the parties, but note that this information can be provided in order to achieve sequential composition.
Real experiment. In experiment RealŜ ,R (N, k, M 1 , . . . , M N , Σ) the possibly cheating senderŜ is given messages (M 1 , . . . , M N ) as input and interacts with possibly cheating receiverR(Σ), where Σ is a selection algorithm that on input the full collection of messages thus far received, outputs the index σ i of the next message to be queried. At the beginning of the experiment, bothŜ andR output initial states (S 0 , R 0 ). In the adaptive case, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k the sender computes S i ←Ŝ(S i−1 ), and the receiver computes (R i , M i ) ←R(R i−1 ), where M i may or may not be equal to M i . In the non-adaptive case, the Receiver obtains no messages until the k th round, and therefore the selection strategy Σ must be non-adaptive. At the end of the k th transfer the output of the experiment is (S k , R k ).
We will define the honest Sender algorithm S as one that runs S I (M 1 , . . . , M N ) in the first phase, during each transfer runs S T () and outputs S k = ε as its final output. The honest Receiver R runs R I in the first phase, and R T (R i−1 , σ i ) at the i th transfer, and outputs R k = (M σ 1 , . . . , M σ k ) as its final output.
Ideal experiment. In experiment IdealŜ ,R (N, k, M 1 , . . . , M N , Σ) the possibly cheating sender algorithmŜ generates messages (M * 1 , . . . , M * N ) and transmits them to a trusted party T . In the i th roundŜ sends a bit b i to T ; the possibly cheating receiverR (Σ) transmits σ * i to T . In the adaptive case, if b i = 1 and σ * i ∈ {1, . . . , N } then T hands M * σ i * toR . If b i = 0 then T hands ⊥ tô R . Note that in the non-adaptive case, T caches its responses toR and delivers the full collection at the conclusion of the k th round. After the k th transfer the output of the experiment is (S k , R k ).
Let (·) be a polynomially-bounded function. We now define Sender and Receiver security in terms of the experiments above.
Sender Security. An OT 
Constructions
Next, we present several generic fully-simulatable oblivious transfer schemes built from any secure, committing blind IBE scheme.We approach this task in two phases: first, we propose a non-adaptive OT N k protocol and prove its security in the standard model. We next propose an adaptive OT N k×1
secure the random oracle model. Finally, we sketch a path to removing the random oracles, by adapting techniques proposed in [CNS07] .
Non-adaptive OT
N k without Random Oracles Given a committing blind IBE scheme Π, it is tempting to consider the following "intuitive" protocol: First, the Sender runs the IBE Setup algorithm and sends params to the Receiver. Next, for i = 1, . . . , N the Sender transmits an encryption of message M i under identity "i". To obtain k messages, the Receiver extracts decryption keys for identities (σ 1 , . . . , σ k ) via k distinct executions of BlindExtract, and uses these keys to decrypt the corresponding ciphertexts. If Π is a blind IBE secure in the sense of definition 3.5, then a cheating Receiver gains no information about the messages corresponding to secret keys he did not extract. Similarly, with additional precautions, a cheating Sender does not learn the identities extracted. However, it seems difficult to show this protocol is fully-simulatable, because the ideal Sender would have to form the N ciphertexts before learning the messages that k of them must decrypt to! Fortunately, we are able to convert this simple idea into the fully-simulatable OT N k protocol shown in Figure 2 . We require only the following modifications: first, we have the Sender prove knowledge of the value msk using appropriate zero-knowledge techniques. 2 Then, rather than transmitting the ciphertext vector during the first phase of the protocol, the Sender transmits only a commitment to a collision-resistant hash of the ciphertext vector, and sends the actual ciphertexts at the end of the k th round together with a proof that she can open the commitment to the hash of the ciphertexts. (She does not open the commitment; she only proves that she knows how to do so.) We present a full proof of Theorem 4.3 in Appendix B.
Adaptive OT
N k×1 in the Random Oracle Model While our first protocol is efficient and full-simulation secure, it permits only non-adaptive queries. For many practical applications (e.g., oblivious retrieval from a large database), we desire a protocol that supports an adaptive query pattern. We approach this goal by first proposing an efficient OT N k×1 protocol secure in the random oracle model. The protocol, which we present in Figure 3 , requires an IBE scheme with a super-polynomial message space (as in the constructions of §3.1), and has approximately the same efficiency as the construction with random oracles of Camenisch et al. [CNS07] . However, their construction requires unique blind signatures and the two known options due to Chaum [Cha82] and Boldyreva [Bol03] both require interactive complexity assumptions. By using the blind IBE schemes in §3.1, our protocols can be based on the DBDH assumption. protocol of figure 3 is sender-secure and receiver-secure in the full-simulation model. Furthermore, when Π ∈ (Π 1 , Π 2 ), the OT protocol is secure under the DBDH assumption.
We sketch a proof of theorem 4.4 in Appendix C. A nice feature of this proof is our ability to use the random oracle H(·) in place of the extractor for BlindExtract.
Sender and Receiver agree on parameters for a commitment scheme and a collision-resistant hash function H. a 1. Generate (params, msk ) ← Setup(1 κ , c(κ)).
2. For j = 1, . . . , N , set C j ← Encrypt(params, j, M j ). 3. Compute (C, D) ← Commit (H(C 1 , . . . , C N ) ). 4. Send (params, C) to Receiver. 5. Conduct P oK{(msk ) : (params, msk ) ∈ Setup(1 κ , c(κ))}. 6. If the proof does not verify, abort.
For i = 1, ..., k, run BlindExtract on identity σ i for Receiver to obtain sk σ i .
Following the k th extraction: 1. Send the ciphertexts (C 1 , . . . , C N ) to the Receiver.
3. If the proof does not verify, or for any i IsValid(params, i, C i ) = 1, abort and output ⊥.
a In the case of Pedersen's commitment scheme, the parameters may be generated by the Receiver. H may also be selected by the Receiver. (C 1 , . . . , C N ). To ensure that each round is consistent with the previous rounds, the Sender would need to prove that the underlying plaintexts remain the same from round to round. This can be achieved using standard proof techniques, but is impractical for large values of k or N .
Alternatively, we could combine our scheme with the standard model OT N k×1 of Camenisch et al. [CNS07] . Their efficient OT N k×1 , for example, incurs only a constant cost per transfer phase. However, the protocol relies on the dynamic q-Strong DH and q-Power Decisional DH assumptions,
2. Select random W 1 , . . . , W N ∈ M, and for j = 1, . . . , N set: Send (params, C 1 , . . . , C N ) to Receiver.
5. If the proof fails to verify or for any i IsValid(params, i, C i ) = 1, abort and set M σ 1 , . . . , M σ k ← ⊥.
In the i th transfer, R runs BlindExtract on identity σ i , to obtain sk σ i . where large values of q require larger than normal security parameters [Che06] . Fortunately, one might be able to keep q small (on the order of k rather than N ) by combining the Camenisch et al. scheme with ours as follows: in their initialization, the Sender releases N values corresponding to the messages that require q = N . Instead, we could use a blind IBE scheme to encrypt these N values during initialization, and then during the adaptive transfer phase, a Receiver could request the decryption key of his choice along with the information required in the Camenisch et al. scheme. Thus, reducing the values available to an adversary to q = k.
If BlindExtract fails, then set
M σ i to ⊥. 2. Else set t ← Decrypt(params, σ i , sk σ i , A σ i ) and set M σ i ← B σ i ⊕ H (t). Output S i = S i−1 Output R i = (R i−1 , M σ i ).
Other Applications of Blind IBE
Privacy-preserving delegated keyword search. Several works use IBE as a building-block for public-key searchable encryption [BCOP04, WBDS04] . These schemes permit a keyholder to delegate search capability to other parties. For example, Waters et al. [WBDS04] describe a searchable encrypted audit log in which a third party auditor is granted the ability to independently search the encrypted log for specific keywords. To enable this function, a central authority generates "trapdoors" for the keywords that the auditor wishes to search on. In this scenario, the trapdoor generation authority necessarily learns each of the search terms. This may be problematic in circumstances where the pattern of trapdoor requests reveals sensitive information (e.g., the name of a user under suspicion). By using blind and partially-blind IBE, we permit the authority to generate trapdoors, yet learn no information (or only partial information) about the search terms. 3
Blind and partially-blind signature schemes. Moni Naor observed that each adaptive-identity secure IBE implies an existentially unforgeable signature scheme [BF01] . By the same token, an adaptive-identity secure blind IBE scheme implies an unforgeable, selective-failure blind signature scheme. This result applies to the adaptive-identity secure Π 2 protocol of §3.1.2, and to the selectiveidentity secure protocol Π 1 when that scheme is instantiated with appropriately-sized parameters and a hash function (see §7 of [BB04] ). The efficient BlindExtract protocol for the adaptive-identity secure Π 2 scheme can also be used to construct a partially-blind signature, by allowing the signer (the master authority) to supply a portion of the input string. Partially-blind signatures have many applications, such as document timestamping and electronic cash [MS98] .
Temporary anonymous identities. In a typical IBE, the master authority can link users to identities. For some applications, users may wish to remain anonymous or pseudonymous. By employing (partially-)blind IBE, an authority can grant temporary credentials without linking identities to users or even learning which identities are in use.
2. Each time A engages S in a BlindExtract protocol, S behaves as follows. In the first message of the protocol, A must send to S a value h and prove knowledge of values (y, id ) such that h = g y ·g id 1 . If the proof fails to verify, S aborts. Since this proof of knowledge is implemented using the extractable techniques mentioned in §2, S can efficiently extract the values (y, id ). 3. Next, S submits id to the trusted party, who returns the valid secret key for this identity
Observe that the responses of S are always correctly formed (as A can verify) and drawn from the same distribution as those of P. Thus, Game Real and Game Ideal are indistinguishable to both A and D. We also note (as above) that the identity id being requested by A is efficiently extractable (by an extractor with special rewind capabilities not available to P).
Next, we turn out attention to selective-failure blindness for protocol BlindExtract = (P, U). Here A outputs params and two identities id 0 , id 1 ∈ I. Then a random bit b is chosen. Next, A is given black-box access to two oracles U(params, id b ) and U(params, id b−1 ). The U algorithms conduct the BlindExtract protocol (with A playing the role of P), and produce local output First, we observe that in this protocol, U speaks first and sends to A a value h uniformly distributed in G and then performs a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge PoK {(y, id ) : h = g y ·g id 1 }. Suppose that A runs one or both of his oracles up to this point. Now, it is A's turn to speak, and at this point, his views so far are computationally indistinguishable. Let's assume that A must now return two values (d 0 , d 1 ) ∈ G 2 to the first oracle. Suppose A chooses this pair using any strategy he wishes. At the point A fixes on two values, he is able to predict the output sk i of these oracles U(params, id b ) with non-negligible advantage as follows: This prediction is correct, because A is performing the same check as the honest U, and when both tests succeed, outputting a pair of valid secret keys obtained via BlindExtract(params, id ), as does U. But at a higher-level, note that if A is able to predict the final output of its oracles accurately, then A's advantage in distinguishing U(params, id b ) and U(params, id b−1 ) is the same without this final output. Thus, all of A's advantage must come from distinguishing the earlier messages of the oracles. Since these oracles only send one uniformly random value h ∈ G and then perform a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge about the representation of h with respect to public values, we know from the security of the underlying proof that A cannot distinguish between them with non-negligible probability. 2
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof sketch. This proof follows the outline of the proof of Theorem 3.6 almost identically. Again we observe that IND-ID-CPA security can be shown via the original proof by Naccache [Nac05] .
To satisfy leak freeness, the simulator S operates exactly as before: starting up an internal copy of A in step (1), extracting the values (y, id ) from A in step (2), querying the trusted party for (3), and returning the pair
to A in step (4). Although the internal structure of the secret keys in the Naccache-Waters IBE differ from those of the Boneh-Boyen IBE, the key observation here is that S doesn't need to know anything about this structure to compute the correct response in step (4).
To satisfy selective-failure blindness, we first observe that the prediction of U's final output is done exactly as before. Thus, A must be able to distinguish the oracles after seeing only a value h again uniformly distributed in G and a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge about the representation of h with respect to public values. We conclude that this advantage must be negligible. 2
B Proofs of Security for the OT

N k Protocol
We now prove Theorem 4.3. The proof is divided into two parts, one to show that the OT scheme meets the sender security property, and a second to show receiver security.
Proof of Sender Security (Theorem 4.3). For any real-world cheating receiverR we can construct an ideal-world receiverR such that the "real" and "ideal" experiments are computationally indistinguishable. More formally, define some set of negligible functions where ν n (·) indicates the n th function. Then ∀ p.p.t. D:
To describe the construction ofR we will begin with the real-world experiment, and modify elements via a series of games until we arrive at the ideal-world experiment. For notational convenience, let Adv [ Game i ] be D's advantage in distinguishing the output of Game i from the Real distribution. Game 1. In this game, we employ the knowledge extractor for BlindExtract to extract from R each of the identities (σ 1 , . . . , σ k ) from the k sequential executions of the BlindExtract protocol. 5 If the knowledge extractor fails for any execution, setR 's output to ⊥. Let Pr [ error ] be the probability that the knowledge extractor fails during any given execution,
Game 2. In this game, the commitment C is replaced with a commitment to a random value, and the final proof-of-knowledge for decommitment is replaced with a simulated proof. The difference between this game and Game 2 is equal to D's advantage in correctly distinguishing C from a valid commitment on H(C 1 , . . . , C N ), and the proof simulation from a valid proof. We define this probability as Adv [ dec ], and note that Adv [ dec ] ≤ ν 3 (κ) for a secure commitment scheme and zero-knowledge proof.
Game 3.
In the final game, we alter the ciphertext vector (C 1 , . . . , C N ) to produce a new vector (C 1 , . . . , C N ) as follows: for j = 1, . . . , N if j / ∈ (σ 1 , . . . , σ k ), set
, and otherwise set C j ← C j . By Lemma B.1 below, the security properties of Π imply that Adv [
Summing the differences between the above games, it is clear that Adv [ Game 3 ] is negligible, and therefore no p.p.t. algorithm can distinguish the distribution of Game 3 from Game 0. The ideal-world receiverR is an algorithm that runsR, and (1) issues it a random commitment, (2) extracts the values (σ 1 , . . . , σ k ) fromR's executions of the BlindExtract protocol, (3) transmits these values to the trusted party T to receive (M σ 1 , . . . , M σ k ). Next, (4) for i = 1, . . . , k,R sets C σ i = Encrypt(params, σ i , M σ i ) and each of the remaining ciphertexts to encryptions of a random message, and (5) sends (C 1 , . . . , C N ) toR along with a simulated proof of knowledge of the opening of the commitment. Proof sketch. We show, via a series of hybrids, that no p.p.t. D distinguishes Game 2 from Game 3 except with negligible probability, as long as (1) the PoK of msk is zero-knowledge, and (2) Π is both leak-free and IND-sID-CPA-secure.
Zero-Knowledge and Leak-freeness. Consider a pair of hybrid games. Hybrid 0 is identical to Game 2, except that S simulates the PoK of msk . Clearly the zero-knowledge property of Π ensures that this hybrid is indistinguishable from Game 2. Hybrid 1 extends the previous hybrid as follows: S does not run Setup, but is instead given params and an oracle O params,msk (·) and answersR's BlindExtract queries by running Extract with O params,msk and simulating the response. This hybrid is clearly indistinguishable from the previous by the leak-freeness property of Π.
IND-sID-CPA security. Now assume by contradiction that some D distinguishes hybrid 1 from Game 3. If this is the case, then we show how to construct an adversary A that wins the IND-sID-CPA game against Π with non-negligible advantage. This proof is just a standard hybrid argument, but we provide it for completeness. Beginning with hybrid 1 from above, we describe an additional (N − k) hybrids, where the final hybrid is Game 3. Each hybrid j ∈ [2, (N − k)] is identical to hybrid (j − 1) except that the distribution of the ciphertext vector is different at position (C is replaced with the encryption of a random message). If D distinguishes the first and last hybrids with non-negligible probability, then clearly there must exist a D that distinguishes some pair of consecutive hybrids (j, j − 1) with non-negligible probability.
can distinguish two experiments that differ only in the distribution of extracted identities. We conduct our proof using a standard hybrid argument: beginning with Game 1 define a series of k intermediate hybrids during each of which a single execution of BlindExtract is altered from using a "real" identity σ j to some random σ j $ ← [1, N ]. The last hybrid is equivalent to Game 2. If D successfully distinguishes the first and last hybrids, then ∃D , j such that D distinguishes hybrid (j − 1) from hybrid j with maximal probability > ν 2 (κ). We use D to construct an adversary A with non-negligible advantage in winning the selective-failure blindness game against Π.
A runs D and conducts the protocol withŜ as in Game 1 up to the point where R initiates the BlindExtract protocol. At all but the th execution of BlindExtract, A selects the appropriate identity distribution (σ k or σ k ) for hybrid (j − 1). At the th execution, A selects σ Note that when b = 0, the th extraction is conducted on σ , and thus the game has the correct distribution for hybrid (j − 1). When b = 1, the extraction is conducted on random σ and thus the game has the correct distribution for hybrid j. If D outputs 1 with probability α when presented with hybrid (j − 1) and probability β when presented with hybrid j, then A guesses correctly and wins the selective-failure blindness game with probability |β−α| 2 . If we assume that |β − α| > ν 2 (κ) then A wins with non-negligible advantage. Since contradicts our assumption about Π, then D succeeds with probability ≤ ν 2 (κ) and thus D succeeds with probability ≤ k · ν 2 (κ).
We conclude our sketch by observing thatŜ commits to the ciphertext vector in the first stage of the protocol. Assuming that H(·) is collision resistant, and the commitment scheme is binding, thenŜ's choice of (C 1 , . . . , C N ) is independent of all subsequent actions including executions of BlindExtract. Proof sketch. Let D be a p.p.t. distinguisher that distinguishes the distributions of Game 3 and Game 2 with non-negligible advantage. This implies that for some j it is the case that with non-negligible probabilityŜ (in cooperation with D) outputs at least one ciphertext C σ j such that Decrypt(sk σ j , C σ j ) = Decrypt(Extract(msk , σ j ), C σ j ), while simultaneously the statement IsValid(params, σ j , C σ j ) = 1 (since this condition is ensured by the protocol). Thus, by definition the algorithmŜ must succeed in the game of definition 3.8 with non-negligible probability. Since Π is a committing IBE scheme, then we can bound D's advantage as ≤ ν 3 (κ). 
D Committing IBE
In this section we sketch a proof of theorem 3.9, which states that both Π 1 and Π 2 are committing blind IBE schemes in the sense of definition 3.8. Note that we have not defined a (non-blind) Extract protocol for Π 1 and Π 2 ; thus, for the purposes of this proof, we will assume that all key extraction is performed via the BlindExtract protocol. (An Extract protocol could use the extraction algorithms defined by Boneh-Boyen [BB04] and Naccache [Nac05] , but would include an additional check conducted by the user, to verify the correctness of the obtained secret key.) We now proceed with the sketch.
Proof sketch. Recall that for params = (γ, g, g 1 , g 2 , h, F ), msk = g α 2 , message M ∈ G T , identity id ∈ I and random elements s, r ∈ Z q , well-formed ciphertexts and keys have the following structure:
In both Π 1 and Π 2 , the BlindExtract protocol includes a correctness check on the returned secret key. When the group parameters γ are valid, this check ensures that the user's output will either be ⊥, or a key of the form shown in equation 2 above. 6 Similarly, the Decrypt algorithm includes a validity check to ensure that (a) the group parameters γ are correct (this check may be probabilistic, but is inaccurate with at most negligible probability), and (b) ciphertexts are of the form shown in equation 1. A failure in the BlindExtract check causes that protocol to output ⊥, and a failed ciphertext check will cause Decrypt to output φ regardless of which secret key is used. Now consider a malicious master authority A with non-negligible advantage in the game of 3.8. For A to succeed, it must hold that neither execution of BlindExtract with A outputs ⊥, and Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C) = Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C). This implies that the (possibly probabilistic) group parameter check was conducted twice on γ, and succeeded at least once (else both calls to Decrypt would output φ). We denote by β the probability that A succeeds when the parameters γ are not valid.
In the event that the group parameters are valid and A succeeds, then by the ciphertext/key validity checks in BlindExtract and Decrypt, it must be the case that C, sk id , sk id all have the correct form for (respectively) some values s, r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z q and yet Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C) = Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C). Yet, by examining the math of the decryption algorithm we see that this cannot be the case. The following equation must hold for every tuple s, r 1 , r 2 ∈ Z q : Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C) = Decrypt(params, id, sk id , C)
X · e(F (id) s , g r 1 ) e(g s , g α 2 · F (id) r 1 ) = X · e(F (id) s , g r 2 ) e(g s , g α 2 · F (id) r 2 ) = X e(g s , g α 2 )
A's advantage in the game as therefore bounded by β, the probability that at least one execution of the group parameter check incorrectly accepts γ as valid. Since the definition of the group parameter check ensures that β is negligible in κ, we conclude our proof.
2
On other committing blind IBE schemes. We conclude with a general observation: that any "unique" (or "functionally-unique") secure blind IBE is implicitly committing. Borrowing from the language of signatures, we define a unique IBE as having one valid identity secret key for each identity in the system, while a functionally-unique IBE may possess multiple keys per identity, but it is hard for even the master authority to compute more than one. Since the schemes presented herein are not unique, we might simplify our constructions by looking for such schemes.
